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Part II 
EURATOM 
The  power  of  the  atom  revealed itself to  the  world  in a  terrifying 
form.  Ten  years  later it appears  as  the  ess~ntial resource  over  the  long 
range  for  the  development  and  the  renewal of  production and  for  progress 
in peaceful endeavors.  A new  technical revolution is in sight.  If Europe 
does  not  act urgently  to  overcome  the  serious delay that it has  faced  from 
the  beginning,  its share  in this development  may  well  be  permanently 
jeopardized. 
I. 
The  necessary m:eans  are  no  longer within  the  reach of  individual 
European countries.  One  exrumple  will clearly show  the ·waste  and  the  delay 
that could  result  from  the  pursuit  of  isolated efforts.  The  United States 
is  today studying  the  operation of  thirty m:odels  of different reactor..s. 
Such  is  the  order  of  magnitude  of  the  research  and  investment  that must  be 
undertaken if the  most  fruitful solutions are  not  to  be  overlooked.  It is 
difficult to  imagine  any  single European country having  the  possibility of 
working  on  that scale;  even  assuming  that several might  have  the means  of 
doing so separately,  one  can  imagine  the  frightful  loss of  resources. 
Moreover,  the  atomic  energy field  is evolving  extraordinarily rapidly,  and 
whatever  is to  be  undertaken might  prove  in vain if begun  too late.  Any 
delay would  mean  letting a  new  period of  development  pass  by  without  taking 
part,  and  the  appearance  of  new  techniques  in  the  subsequent  period would 
find  the  European countries without  the experience,  the  means  and  the 
technicians  necessary  for  meeting  the  challenge.  Hesitation would  be  all 
the more  unjustifiable since  in this  field  there  are still few  positions 
and  vested  interests or  artificial barriers.  The  longer  the  wait  the  more 
difficult it will be  to  take  action. 
Although it is very difficult  to cite figures,  certain orders of magni-
tude  considered probable  by  the  experts will enable  the Governments  to 
appreciate  the  scope  of  the  probJem,  It can  be  estimated that  the  United 
States has  devoted until now  about  $15  billion to nuclear  energy  and Great 
Britain the  equivalent  of  about  ~1.5 billion.  On  the  basis of  a  very  rough 
estimate  of  expenditures earmarl{ed  for military equipment,  the  balance 
devoted to  industrial nuclear energy would  be  $3  billion in  the  United States 
and  the  equivalent  of  $500 million in Great Britain.  Likewise,  France  has 
spent  the  equivalent  of  $200 million ower  a  nine  year  period,  All  these 
figures  represent Government  spending  and  do  not  include  private  financing. 
Although  the  enormous  expenditures made  have  produced  results  that  are 
now  public  knowledge,  they  sl1ow  clearly enough  the  marrnitude  of  the  resources 
that  the European States t'lill henceforth have  to  find  if they  are  unwilling 
to  be  perma.nently dependent  on  those  who  are  so  far  ahead  of  them  in this 
field.  Whereas  the  production  and  the  technical developv1ent  of  nuclear  energy 
have  been  largely  financed  from  military budgets,  the  problem  is  just  the 
reverse  today:  concentration on  the  peaceful  use  of  atomic  energy  seems 
indis  pens able. 
The  effort to be  accomplished must  take  into  account  the  conditions 
for  supply of essential, natural or  treated materials,  which  have  been 
largely ihfluenced  by  the  historical circumstances  of what  began  as  a 
military development,  and  are  not  those  of  a  free  market.  The  natural re-
sources are  very closely controlled by  a  small  number  of  countries which 
are  producers  or have  become  buyers.  There  are  only three  world  powers--
the  United States,  the  Soviet Union,  and Great  Britain--which enrich 
uranium  in order  to  increase its fissile properties. 
An  essential requirement  is  to  ensure  against  the  risk of  a  destruc-
tive or  a  care less use \6f  nuclear  material~!-.  There will be  no  development 
of  the  atomic  industry  unless security conditions  are established that 
avert perils to  the  life and  the  health of  labor  and  populations,  and 
guarantee that  nuclear materials will  not  be  diverted to uses  other  than 
those  for  which  they are destined.  It is these  conditions  that will permit 
a  free  and  frank  exchange  of  acquired  knowledge  thanks  to  the  creation of  a 
spirit of  confidence  that  is  fund~~ntal in Europe  with its background of 
centuries of strife. 
Essentially than Europe  must  provide  itself with rapid  and  substantial -2-
means  of  carrying  out  these  aims,  assure equal treatment  and  regularity in 
the  supply  of essential materials,  and  establish in common  the conditions 
for  security in atomic  development. 
The  characteristics of  the  atomic  energy field make  it evident  that 
these  tasks  cannot  be  accomplished without  a  common  organization. 
II. 
There  is  a  rapid  growth  in European  requirements  for  energy which  in 
the  near  future  threatens  to  become  much  rarer  and  more  expensive.  Atomic 
energy must  contrihute  to overall energy supply  as  ~oon as  possible  if this 
shortage  and  rise  in cost  is  to be  avoided.  Atomic  energy will rapidly 
appear  all the  more  economical  since other  sources  of  energy will on  the 
contrary be  more  expensive.  The  creation of this  new  source  of  energy there-
fore  seens  to  be  much  more  of  an  imperative  necessity  for  Europe  than  for 
the  United States,  for  example.  In addition,  it will make  possible  the 
development  of  certain regions  that  have  suffered because  of  their distance 
from  traditional sources of  en~r.gy. 
Yet  if it were  only  a  question of  covering energy requirements, 
theoretically this could  be  done  by  importing  the  nuclear  taaterials  and  the 
necessary equipment.  But  tbe  task at  hand  is  a  far  broader  one:  a  nuclear 
industry must  be  developed  in Europe  itself, without  which  the  European 
States would  be  conde:.med  to  a  permanently  subordinate  position  among  the 
atomic  powers.  The  creation of  this  industry will envelop the entire 
European  economy  in  a,  new  technical revolution,  It should  be  emphasized 
at  the  outset that  nuclear  energy  is not  limited  in its applications  to 
a  certain few  large  industries.  Even  now  it interests  very diverse  indus-
trial sectors  and  techniques,  :1nd  the  numb~r will not  fail  to  become 
progressively larger. 
The  immediate  consequence  of  this conclusion is  that  the  development 
of  atomic  energy must  not  be  limited to  a  few  establishments;  on  the  con  .... 
trary,  an effort must  be  made  to  adopt  the  broadest  and  most  flexible 
system in order  to ensure  the  largest  nossible  number  of European  industriesi 
benefits  from  these  technical  advances.  In particular,  the  organization 
must  be  able  to establish arrangements  equally well with  public  organizations 
and  private  industry,  with centralized and decentralized  economic  systems,  and 
lastly make  possible mixed  ownership  arrangements  which will undoubtedly 
prevail in a  great  number  of  cases.  Whereas  absolute  control by  the  public 
authorities  accompanied  the military phase  of  nuclear  development,  the  time 
has  now  come  \IJhen  the  rise of  the  industry will  depend  on  the  skill and  the 
perseverance  with which  the  public  authorities  ami  the  common  organization 
are  able  to create  the  basic  conditions  permitting  industry  as  a  whole  and 
free  initiative to  play  th·~ir essential role. 
Hence,  the  purpose  of  the  common  organization is to contribute  to  the 
formation  and  the  rapid growth of  a  nuclear  industry as well  as  to  the  appli· 
cation of  nuclear  development  in industry  and  the  economy  as  a  whole: 
1.  By  developing  research  and  ensuring  the  broadest  dissemination 
of  knowladge  and  techniques; 
2.  By  establishing and seeing  to  the  enforcement  of  uniform safety 
norms  for  the  protection of  the  labor  force  and  of  the  general 
population; 
3.  By  facilitating its investments  and  creating  the  fundamental 
installations which  cannot  be  undertaken by  isolated industries or 
by  individual countries; 
4.  By  providing it with security and  equal  treatment  in its 
conditions  for  supply of  nuclear  ores  and  fuels;  and 
s.  By  assuring it wide  outlets  and  the  best  technical means  by 
the  merger  of markets  as  regards materials,  supplies  and  specialized 
equipment,  and  by  the  unrestricted migration of specialists. 
The  organization for  which  the  name  EURATJ~l has  been  put  forward will 
therefore  have  to develop its activity along  these  five main lines.  The 
organization will rest  on  the Council of  ~linisters,  the Court  and  the Assembly 
which  are  provided  elsewhere  in tl1is  reoort  for  th~ r.ommon  nHtrkPt.  Ann  'N'h1r.h -3-
will exercise their  functions  and  their control  according  to  the  same 
rules;  a  European Atomic  Energy Commission shall  be  created along  analogous 
lines  to  the  European Common  Market  Commission. 
This Community  will naturally  be  open  to  all European countries which 
will accept  its rules.  In  any  case  it will seek  an especially close 
association with Great Britain.  fhe  diversity of  the  tasks  to  be  accom-
plished makes  it possible  to measure  the diversity of  the  relations that 
could  be  established  between  the Community  and  countries that did  not 
believe  themselves  able  to  join in;  these  relations will embrace  such 
different  areas  as  the  exchange  of  information  and  knowledge,  supply of 
materials,  participation in the  establishment  and  in the  use  of  industrial 
installations,  technical supplies.  Far  from  being contradictory,  this 
Community  and  cooperation  among  the different countties within  the  Organi-
zation for  European Econornic  Cooperation complement  and  strengthen one 
another. 
The  Community  will develop  a  permanent  liaison within the  OE.EC  with 
other European countries,  just  as  it will with  the  rest of  the  world  through 
the  International Atomic  Energy Agency  now  in the  process  of  creation. 
Chapter  I 
The  Development  of  Hesearch  and  Excliance  of  Information 
The  atomic  energy  field  is  above  all the  one  in which  industry depends 
on science,  that  is,  on  research,  specialists  and  the  dissemination of 
knowledge. 
The  magnitude  of  the  means  necessary  for  research  and  for  the  training 
of  specialists  implies  action  in common. 
The  common  organization will itself ensure  the  carrying out  of  only  a 
fraction of  this research.  It is  advisable  therefore  to  provide  elsewhere 
ways  of  avoiding duplication leading  to v.rasted  efforts in  independent 
research  programs  and  ways  of  best  assuring  the  dissemination of  knowledge 
and  technology. 
Section 1  - Action  to  be  takt'!n  by  EURA1\.m.  The  European Atomic  Com-
mission,  assisted  by  an  economic  and  sci~ntific committee  composed  of 
specialists, will create  a  research center  and  schools  for  the  training of 
specialists,  both of  which will work  in liaison with existing  institutes. 
The  main  function of  the  research  center wottld  be  to  complement  the 
research pursued  by  national,  gov~rnmental or  private bodies.  In addition, 
it should  ensure  standardization and  the  establishment  of  uniform  termino-
logy,  set up  an  international system of  measurement  and  form  a  central 
bureau  for  nuclear  measurements  working  in collaboration with existing 
countries. 
Schools  for  training specialists  should operate  in liaison with  the 
center  and  cover  the  following  subjects  in particular:  min~_ng prospecting; 
the  production of  very  pure  nuclear materials  and  the  treatment  of  these 
metals  follov!ing  irradiation;  engineering  in the  atomic  energy field;  the 
production and  the  use  of  radio-isotopes.  Europe  is far  behind  as  regards 
the  number  and  the  degree  of  specialized training of  its technicians. 
Decisive  action is necessary to  overcome  this shortage.  The  school  and 
the  research center could  form  the  foundations  of  a  European  university 
where  scholars  from  the different countries would  teach  together  and  which 
like  any  university should  have  recognized  autonomy. 
Other  more  dispersed or  more  occasional activities will  prove  neces-
sary at certain moments,  such  as  the  for!llat.ion  of  specialized  teams  for 
drawing  up  plans  for  research or  power  reactors,  and  teams  for  aerial 
prospecting  in order  to  discover  ore deposits. 
The  European Commission will ensure  liaison with  the  European Nuclear 
Research Center. 
Section 2  - Cooperation  in Research.  The  greater part of  research 
will continue  to  be  carried out  in each  country  hy  public  or  private 
institutes or  by  the  industries  themselves.  Research  is not  an activity 
that  can be  carried out strictly according  to  plan without  losing  the 
benefit of  achievements  resulting  from  sudden inspiration or  chance.  It -4--' 
is only  a  question of  avoiding  wasted efforts:  this is one  of  the  most 
effective aspects of  action  in  common  under  a  non-centralized  form. 
To  facilitate  a  coordinated  development  of  research,  the European 
Commission will forecast  objectives  for  nuclear  energy. production that  will 
situate  tt1e  effort  to  he  undertaken within  tile  framework  of  the  realities 
to which  it must  corresrond.  i\loreover,  these  \)bjf'ctives  c.an  be  drawn  up 
only  through  cooperation  between  the  j\tomic  Conunis.sion  and  t'1e  European 
institution to  be  ~iv~n a  responsibilit)'  for  estim;1ting  resources  and 
requirements  in  tiE~  energy  fielcl.  It is  propos2:..i  elsewhere  that  this  task 
be  conf~ded to  the  High  Authority of  the  european Coal  and  .Steel Comrnunity. 
The  definition of  objective~ for  eneq~y of  nuclear  oriGin  would  result  from 
a  reciprocal  a~justment of  estimates  on  energy  requirements  to  be  met  and 
on  the  possibiiities of  d9ing  so  by  means  of  tile  new  technology.  fhis 
common  task  wi~l be  executed  all  the  more  effectively since  the  meetings 
of  the  apprCipriate  ihstitutions  at  whic!1  this  is discussed will  be  attended 
by  formally desiGnated  members  of  the  other  institution. 
The  communication  of  research  programs  to  the  Commission will enable 
it by  means  of  reasoned  opinions  to  discourage  useless duplication or  to 
redirect effr,rts  towards  insufficiently explored  ar~~as,  for  example  in  the 
field  of  fusion  of  light  elements. 
The  different  public  or  private  research  centers  would  regularly  hold 
meetings  for  consultation and  exchange  of  information  under  the  sponsorship 
of  the Commission. 
Lastly,  coordination of  work  \\•ill  result  from  the  very  conditions 
under  which  ltnowledge  and  techniques  would be  placed  at  the  disposal of 
the entire Community. 
Section  3  - Dissemination of  Kncwledge.  A substantial part of  the 
knowledge  acquired  throug  i1  re se a.rcli  cond uc t.ed  in secret over  the  years  was 
revealed  to other  countries  by  th~ mure  :ldvnnced  countries at  the  time  of 
the Geneva Conference  on  atomi(".  energv  r'r(;.blem~.  A still r,reater  mass 
of  documents  incorroraiinc  th.e  r~~·mlL:;,  <Jf  r-es~arch has  just  been  made 
available  to  be  consultect  freely  by  int~rested parties.  In addition, 
information is communicated  under  bilat·~ral agreements.  Those  of  the  member 
States which  on this  basis  have  obtain~d privileged  access  to certain .infor-
nlati6n  will place  this  information at  the  disposal of  the entire Community 
subject  to  the  cons~nt of  their  partner~ in these  et{~reements,  w;1icll  consent 
these  member  States  agree  to  endeavor  to  obtain. 
For  the  re.st,  the  progress  of  the  European  nuclear  industry will be 
all the  more  rapid  if  knowledge  acc1uired  and  tecllniqu~.-:,  developed  in Eurore 
itself.  can be  more  widely  applied.  This  is  a  fundamental  necessity.  In 
the  atomic  energy  field,  the  United  ...,tates  has  instituted  a  special  sy~teut 
wherein  t 11e  results  of  all research are  comr.1unicated  to  t!1e  Atomic  Energy 
Commission.  It is one  thing  to  ensure  that  -t•1e  authors  or  owners  of  in-
ventiOns  are  generously  remunerated  for  the  purpose  of  encourating  resear& 
and  to  protect  them  a~ainst us.?.  of  their discoveries  by  others  without 
appropriate  compensatj(:n.  It is  another  thing,  however,  if this  protectim 
is permitted  to  become  a  liJeans  of  r.cstri.ctiug  or  even halting  the  applic-
ation of  new  techniques  for  the  p11rpose  of  retaining  profits  from  monopoly. 
To  the  fullest extent  pos~ible a  way  of  reconciling  tlle  rights  of 
inventors  or  owners  ot discoveries  and  the  inter~sts of  the  Community  will 
be  sougl1t  through  voluntary cooperation,  for  exarnple,  by  promoting  agree-
ments  on  the  use  of  patents.  In  any  event,  the  holders of  patents will  be 
fully  indemnified  for  the  granting  of  licenses with  no  ex:1ropriation  having 
to  be  envisaged. 
Nevertheless,  it aopears  indispensable  to  provide  for  complementary 
measures  in cases of  necessity. 
(a)  EURAfO~l \::ill  be  granted  the  option of  utilizing all patents  be-
longing either  to  the  States  and  public  institutions or  to  private enter-
prises which will  be  necessary  for  the  conduct  of  its own  research  and  the 
operation of  its installations.  The  org~nization would  also  have  the 
option of  granting sub-licens.:s  whenever  it must  entrust  work  or orders  to 
organizations  or enterprises  in order  to satisfy its own  requirements.  In 
this respect,  patents  under  public  and  privat~ ownership will  be  treated  m 
the  same  footing,  the  only difference  being  the  procedure giving  the  commm 
organization  the  option  to  use  t:·,em.  ln  ·the  case  of  patents  which  are  the 
property of  ~tates,  the  granting of  licenses  to  the  comraon  organization 
will result  from  the  very  comr~itments of  the  :=itates.  In  the  cas2  of  private persons  n.r  legal entities, it will be  necessary  to have  recourse  to non-
exclusive  licenses,  which would  be  obligatory in  the  absence  of  a 
contractual  ftgreement; 
(b)  If a  patented invention is of essential  importance  for  the 
development  of atomic energy in  the  Community  and  by  his  own  production or 
by  the granting of licenses  the  owner  of  the  invention does not cover  the 
~ommunity's requirements  within a  reasonable  period,  he  ean be  requested 
to place non-exclusive  licenses  for  this  invention at the disposal of other 
bodies or enterprises.  In  this  case,  or when  an  o\mer of a  patent offers 
voluntarily to grant  a  license,  the  member  States on  their side must 
abstain  from  restrictive measures  provided  for  under  their respective 
legislation with  reference  to  inventions. 
(c)  Patents belonging  to  EUrti\T~I,  whether  the  result of its own 
research or acquired  b~,  the  organizatir·n,  will  be  placed upon  request at 
the disposal  of melllbe r  States and enterprises  under their jurisdiction by 
means  of non-exclusive  licenses  in exchange  for appropriate  indemnification. 
The  decisions  of  th~ Cornm.iss.ion,  particularly as  regards  whether a 
technical process  or a  discovery is  consid~red essential,  can  be  appealed 
before  the  Sourt. 
The  rules  provided apply only to ca&es  in \':h ich a  patent  has  been 
obtained or at  least  requested.  tt goes  without  saying  that knowledge 
acquired  in  common  research will  be  placed at  the disposal  of States and 
interested parties. 
The  common  organiza_tion shall in addition or3anize a  procedure  by 
which  the  research  centers  or enterprises may  deposit with  the Commission 
the  r~sults of their  research with  the  proviso  that  the  Commission  shall 
communicate  these  results only  to  such  other centers and enterprises which 
are  in the  same  field of  research and  are  prepared  to accept a  reciprocal 
obligation. 
Chapter  2 .. 
Security Norms  and  ~ontrols. 
An  absolute  protection of  the  labor force  and  of  the  general  popu-
lation against  the  risk  of  radioactivity  is a  fundamental  necessity for  the 
peaceful  use  of atomic energy. 
This  problem  has  already  been the  subject of  1mportant  international 
s t~dies.  A  special  radiation committee  has  b~en  cr·~a  ted  bv  the  United 
Nations  organization and will present its  r~port in  1958.  An  international 
committee  for protection against  radiation is attempting to determine  the 
amount  of radioactivity  the  human  organism  is  &ble  to support.  The  Inter-
na tiona! Labor Org:1niza tion  has  a lrea11y  prese11ted  R  report  on  the  protection 
of workers.  Finally,  the  \\'orld  Health Organization has  taken  up  this 
problem. 
The  States  themselves  have  begun  to establish legislation and  regu-
lations  in  this  field.  It  \>~ill  be  necessary  for such  regulations  to meet 
certain conunon  norms.  To  this end,  the  fundamental  principles should be 
the  subject of a  Convention  annexed  to  the 'Treaty  and  ratified in  the  same 
fashion, 
On  this basis  the  Commission will have  the  tasl(  of working  out more 
precise norms  for  the  Community  as  a  whole.  These will  be  submitted  to a 
vote  of the Assembly  before  their adoption  by  the  Council  of j,'linisters, 
They will  be  imposed  on  the States as udnimum  norms.  They \dll deal  with 
installations,  storage conditions,  transport  conditions  and  the  method  of 
treating materials  and nuclear fuels. 
It is on  the  basis  of  these norms  that the  organization shall exercise 
a  specific control over  installations consuming  or  transforming nuclear 
fuels.  This  control will refer to whether  the  installations  conform  to 
security conditions  for  personnel and populations  and  to the  operating 
conditions  in order to ascertain  the  consumption  of nuclear materials and 
the  transformations  they  undergo.  Any  installation consuming nuclear  fuels 
shall be  reported  to the  Commission  and its fundamental  characteristics 
described  to pennit  the  above  questions  to be  answered.  The  Commission 
can  rule  against an  installation only for  reasons of security.  Creation -6-
of  an  installation in  violatio~ of  this procedure would  entail  the  refusal 
or  the  prohibition of supply of nuclear  fuels. 
Although  it is  the  duty of  the  ~ommission to exercise  this  control 
over  projects. it ~'lill  leav~ to  the States  the  regular surveillance  over 
security conditions  and  the  protaction of health and will ensure  that such 
surveillance  is effective. 
Chapter  3. 
The -:Jevelopment  of  Inv~~tments and  Conunon  Installations. 
Section  1  - Investments.  Just  as  research undertaken  b;  EUi.tA10i\1  will 
be  only  complementary--though essential--to the  over-a·ll  research effort, 
the  largest share  of  investment  in  the  atomic energy field will continue 
to  be  the  responsibility of  pu~lic and  private enterprises.  The  principle 
tvill  be  to  promote  i.nitiati\'E'  vn  the  part  of  the  enterprises  by  guiding 
thei~ action  by  rr~ans  of  progra1.  f0recasts  and  the  dissemination  of  the 
results  of  res2a tch  and  by  providing  ther.1  as  the  case .nay  be,  with  the 
~ecessary financial  a~~istance. 
Th~  investments  of  the  industri~s could  be  assisted by  loans  from  the 
investment  fund  under  the  conditions  and  according  to the  rules provided 
for  the  operation  of  the  fund.  The  projects  concerning atomic energy 
development will be  subm t t ted  by  the  Sornmission  or will  be  trans111i tted 
to it for  opinion. 
The  Organization will  have  no  pmver  to direct  investments,  and  in 
particular no  power  to pronounce  on  the  economic  justification or  the 
location of  installatiorts. 
Its role  in this  respect  ~:·ill  be  si,Hilar  to  that it will fulfill in 
matters  of  researc~. 
Section  2  - C:ommon  Instctllf'ti()ns.  Although  industrial developments 
will  tak~ place mainly  in  the  ent~rp;ises concerned  under  the  stimulus  and, 
as  the  case  may  be,  with  the  assistance  of  the  Community,  one  of  the  justifi-
cations  for  this  ·2ommunity  is  to make  possible· the  creation of  installations 
that would  be  beyond  the  means  of  th.~  enterprises or even  individual States. 
Common  installations are  not  to be  confused with  installations  financed 
from  a  common  budget,  but  include  those  which  the  industry itself would 
carry out  under  cooperative  arrangements  or hy  mixed  ownership solutions 
including both public  and  private  interests.  The  principle  is  to carry out 
investments  on  a  public basis  to  the  extent  that  the  initiative or  the 
possibility of private  industry singly or  in  common  appears  likely to  be 
insufficient. 
The  Org-anization  can  contribute  to  common  installations  by  partici-
pating  th~rein or it Tllay  even  finance  the  installations entirely.  It will 
have  initiative  in this  field. 
The  relation  between  the  Conunission  and  the  common  installations 
administered by it or  in  \\'hich  it participates must  be  sufficiently flexible 
to permit  the  association of  other participants, either public  or private 
or even  from  third countries.  In any case,  the  rights  and  duties  inherent 
in  the  production  of  concentrated  fissionable  rrtaterial  must  be  exercised 
by  BUtlf\1n.1.  The  Commission  must  therefore  have  a  service  for  industrial 
administration and it will be  represented  on  the  boards  of directors of  the 
corporations  in which it participates  on  the  same  basis as  any other partici-
pant,  l"hether member  States,  industrial corporations,  or even,  in certain 
cases,  third countries or foreign  shareholders. 
\. 
Among  the  installations the  joint creation of which must  be  envisaged 
without delay,  attention centers principally on  a  uranium  isotope  separation 
plant  and  a  plant  for the  chemical  treatment  of  irradiated uranium. 
The  first,  by oermitting the  enrichment  of uranium  and  an  increase  in 
the  amount  of  the  fissile  isotope  or uranium  23.._5,  would  j}rovide  a  sure 
source  of supply  for  a  fuel  which  is due  to constitute  the  fundamental  basis 
for  the operation of  reactors  in the  phase  of  technical development  now 
opening;  in view of  the  prospects  for  the  use  of other nuclear materials 
or  the  production of  energy  by  the  fusion  of light elements,  this phase 
may  last only a  limited number  of  years.  r1ence,  this project would  make -7-_  _. 
sense  only if it is carried out  sufficiently soon.  A preparatory organization 
is  being  created  to examine  the different  possible  techniques.  It is essential 
to emrhasize  the contribution that  the  construction and  the existence of  such 
a  plant would  make  toward  progress  in the  atomic  industry  t·~ough the  experience 
acquired  by  the  companies  particirating in  the  construction and  by  the  technicians 
who  would  be  trained in this way. 
The  other  project  refers  to  a  plant  for  treating  irradiated uranium 
wit~ a  view  to  the extraction of  plutonium. 
With  techniques  c!1anging  rapidly,  it is  not  possible  to specify  in  advance 
the  fields  in which  common  installations might  have  to  be  created or  the 
methods  by  which this woulr.l  be  accomplished.  The  greatest  freedom of  action 
should  therefore  be  provided  for  the  future. 
Chapter  4. 
~upplv of  Nuclear  Ores  and  Fuels 
Secti"n  1~-~}~:_chas~ Priority (la priorite d'achat).  Certain--of  the  member 
~tates have  siz·2able  re~.;ources  of1  uraniur.1  and  t11orium  ores at  their disposal  on 
their  territory or  in  their  dependencies.  In  addition,  uranium  235  will either 
be  obtained  from  oth·2r  countries or  procuc.ecl  ill  a  com1:!on  isctope separation 
plant.  fhe  production of  plutonium  and  uraniu111  233,  however,  \-¥ill  be  developed 
slowly  throubh  the .etctual operation of  certet.in  types  of  reactors. 
EUP.P.'fO~l  could  therefore  tnalte  ·a··cte~ .  .~.~lve  contribution to  t',c  development 
of  nuclear  industries  iu·Europc  through  th'?.  priority:it will  be  granted  for  the 
purchase  of  uncommitted  resources  0f  the  member  .:)tates  or  their  dependencies. 
The  purchase  priority has. a·  jual  ccn::; equence. 
The  determination  of  prices  sh·)Ul•j  be  the  responsibility of  an  objective 
body  that will not  .seek  to rterivc!  abusive  profit  from  the  purchase  priority,  but 
which  on the  contrar" will  preoccupy  itself with  th;'!  question of  the  producticn 
conditions  assuring  .i~ng-term supply.  For  this  reason,  if purchasz  prices 
cannot  be  fixed on  a  purely contractual bRsis  it will  be  the  responsibility of 
the  Europea11  Atomic  Comission,  aided  by  a  joint  committee  including  producers 
and  users,  to  arbi.tr.wte  on prices  by  t•J.eans  of  decisions  subject  to  appeal  be tore 
the Court ..  Pri'ce  policy is itself  linked  to  prospection  and  production  policy. 
'l'tt~refure,  r:rocedures  r.IUst  be  cr~~a.ted  such  a3  the  establishment  of  concerted 
produ~tion progra~s or  lon~-term co~tracts. 
In addition,  it is noc  COilCZ.i vable  that  !2Ui~i~i·J:•:  could dis interest itself 
in the  conditions of  use  and  seo~  ..  ~ity  h.)  which  would  be  S\lbj~ct sales of  quan-
ti  ties  over  which  the  Commis~ion itself tl:i.d  not  chOl).Se  to  exercise  this  purchase 
priority.  Comt.tercial negotiation  by  producers  shoulcl  therefore  be  accompanied 
by political n-:--.:gotiation  by  LutV.l'O~l  on  the  s~curity t;uarantees  given by  external 
buyers  and  on  rel~ted advantages,  in the  foim  of technical  information or  sup-
plies,  for  exa111ple,  ·t:I~at  could  be  obtained  for  the ·benefit of  the  (:ommunity  in 
exchange  for  these deliveries. 
The  purchase  priority thus defined coilstitutes  a  fundamental  advantage  for 
all users  iu the  Community,  which  cannct  be  imposed  on  producers  e~{cept  in fa\Or 
of  a  common  organization.  fhe  COITlmon  Qrganization can  itself honor  the  obliga-
tions  associated with this  vurchase  priority only  by  t~e  principle  of  supply 
of  all users  through its channel. 
The  purchase  priority  and  exclusive  supply  through  the  channels  of  the 
organization are  related.  These  two  principles  hold  for  all nuclear  ores  and 
fuels  at all stages of  their  transformation.  If  the establishment of  coherent 
investm~nt progrruns  is not  to  be  jeopardized,  these  principles must  not  preve~ 
fissile materials  produced  through  transformation in installations  that  are  ntt 
·common  installations from  being  used  by  the enterprise  producing  them  or  by  other 
enterprises  for  which  they  are destined by  virtue of  an  agreed  program  (du  fait 
d'un.  programme  lie)  which has  been communicated  in good  time  to  the  common 
organization. 
:Section 2.  -Conditions  for  rJl~cing  nuclear  ma~.;erial;;;  at  tl1e  disposal of 
.!:!.!.m•  The  procedur';S  whereby  nuclear ores  and  fuels  are  placed at  the  disposal 
of consuming  installations  mu~t satisfy the  requirement  for  equal  access  to 
resources  and  control over  their use.  These  procedures  will be  subject  to 
regulations  on .security,  prices  ~u!d allocation. 
1.  Security regulations 
(a)  Eath installation is subject  to  control of  quantities  &tacked, -8-
quantities used  and  materials  transformed,  under  conditions  permitting the 
Organization to  learn the  characteristics of  the  installation. 
(b)  Any  quantity of  materials  earmarked  for  a  user  and  not  actually 
used  in his  installation must  be  placed  in depots  directly controlled or 
controllable  by  EURATOM. 
(c)  Materials shall  be  taken back  from  the  user  in case  of violation 
of  the  security standards  of  the  Cotnmunity  or  of diversion  from  the  uses 
for  which  they  are  destined  in the  request or declaration filed with 
reference  to  these materials. 
(d)  At  the  end of  the  transformation process  the  materials shall be 
returned to  installations belonging  to  EUitATvM  or  controlled by  it, for 
reprocessing  or  for  disposal of dangerous,  permanently useless wastes. 
2.  Re~11lations on Conditions  of  Paym~nt. 
r.taterin.~.s  ar~ placed  at  the  disposal  of  users  under  uniform conditions 
on  the  basis  of  average  supply costs.  Suprly costs  are  determined as  follows: 
-by  the  price  policy defined  by  the  Conw1ission  in the  case  of  supply of 
natural materials originating in territories coming  under  the  jurisdiction 
of  the  111ernber  States; 
- by  the  conditions  under  which  obtained  in the  case of  materials 
originating in third countries; 
~ by  compensating  for  the  value  added  by  transformation in the  case  of 
materials ·obtained  through  transformation in installations  located within 
the  Community. 
3.  Regulations  on  Restrictive Allocation. 
(a)  In all circumstances,  fuels  are  placed at the disposal of users 
without discrimination. 
(b)  If  the  Organization declares itself unable  to deliver within  a 
reasonable  period because  of  a  shortage  of supplies, it is obliged by  that 
token  to  recognize  that  a  shortage  exists  and  to carry out  restrictive 
allocation.  The  allocation is made  on the  basis  of  current  needs  and  not 
past reference  periods. 
(c)  Fissile materials  pro:luced  in installations that  are  not common 
installations  are  reserved  even  in case  of  allocation for  the enterprise 
producing  them  or  tl1ose  for  wJ~ich they  are destined  under  the  program 
binding  the~-~ enterprises.  Available  surpluses can  be  ceded only  to  the 
Organization. 
(d)  In order  to encourage  the  search for  resources,  the  users  to  whom 
the Organization declares  that it cannot deliver  because  of  insufficient 
supply have  the  right  to make  use  of  the  offers that  they  have  received 
from  third countriesi  this right may  be  exercised  under  conditions  to  be 
defined,  \'lhich  preserve  in  any  case  the exercise  of  a  strict control by  the 
Organization.  In fact,  this hypothesis  has  small  chance  to  be  realized 
under  the  actual supply conditions. 
These  fundamental  rules must  in every case  be  respected  in  the 
operations  by which  the Organization places  nuclear  ores  and  fuels  at  the 
disposal of  the user. 
These  conditions  may  normally  be  satisfied even if the Organization 
buys,  resells  and  repurchases after  transformation or  at  the  end of  the 
process.  However,  it would  make  a  practice of establishing  a  lease 
contract: 
- for  materials it has  itself obtained  by  lease; 
for  materials sold to it under  condition of  non-resale; 
- if the  user  chooses  to  lease rather  than to  buy; 
•  lastly,  by  decision of  the Commission  in the  case of  products such 
as fuels  that  are highly enriched or  particularly dangerous  for  any other 
reason;  this decision taken for  reasons  of security \·lith  the  agreement  of -9-
the Council  and  subject  to  appeel before  the Court  applies  to all users 
without  discrimination.  In fact,  the  security rules  and  the  conditions  for 
allocation described  above  will in the  last analysis malte  the distribution 
of materials  to users  the  subject of  truly sui generis contracts. 
Section 3  -Supply Agency.  To  carry out  its supply  functions,  the 
Commission  will establish a  commercial  administrative  agency  (agence a gestion 
commerciale)  having  financial  autonomy  but directly under  the Commission's 
authority. 
The  necessary operating funds  would  normally  be  covered  by  capital 
subscription from  the  users  to be  supplied by  this  agency.  The  number  of 
shares could  be  increased with  the  numr~r of users,  as  is  the  case with  a 
company  with  variable capital (societe  a  capital variable).  The  current 
adllTlinistration of  the  agency would  be  entrusted to  a  director-general or 
to  a  directing committee,  appointed  by  the European Commission after consultation 
with a  council  formed  by  representatives of  the  users. 
This  council would  be  consulted on decisions  pertaining  to  imports 
from  third countries,  exports  to  third countries,  and  the  increase  or  the 
reduction of  stocks. 
EURATUM  may  participate  in  the  capital,  in  particular  in order  to 
finance  the  building  up of  reserve  stocks. 
Chapter  5. 
The  Com.'llon  Market  for  the  Nuclear  Industry 
The  establishment  of  a  common  market  for  Materials,  supplies  and 
specialized equipiltent,  special facilities for  the  unrestricted investment 
of capital in the  nuclear  industry,  and  unrestricted migration of specialists 
are  the  indispensable  conditions  for  the expansion of  nuclear  production in 
Europe,  the  development  of  atomic  energy  and  a  rational expansion of  the 
industry. 
Measures  taken for  that  purpose  should anticipate  the  establishment of 
the  general  common  market  and  be  placed in effect \\'ithout  delay.  The 
industry is  a  new  one  in which  vested  interests  have  not  yet  crystallized. 
Under  the  circumstances  and  contrary  to  the  other  economic  sectors where 
the elimination of  trade barriers can only  be  progressive,  restrictions 
will be  all the easier  to eliminate  the  sooner  and  the  quicker  this is done. 
A practical  problem of  demarcation will  inevitably exist  as  long  as  the 
common  market  is not  established  for  most  products.  On  the  basis of  a  general 
delimitation of  the  field .in question such  a.s  that  already  prepared  uy  the 
work  of  the experts,  and  which  Nould  be  apptoved  by  the Council,  the European 
Commission  would  have  the  responsibility of certifying  the "nuclear"  charac-
ter of  a  given production,  investment  or  category of specialists, subject 
to  a  possible  appeal  to  the Court.  Unrestricted  trade  in products  could  be 
materially  a~sured on  the  basis of  an  accompanying  document  issued by  the 
Commission. 
To  offset  the  risk  that  the  inevitable delay  in  th~ es"tablishment  of 
the  common  market  for  the  nuclear  industry might  cause  increased difficulties, 
standstill measures  are  necessary  in  the  form  of  a  "Standstill Agreement" 
whereby  the States envisaging  the  formation of  EURf.T•)M  will  agree  not  to 
increase  import  or export duties, quantitative restrictions  and  discriminatory 
measures  or  practices. 
In order  to  p-ermit  the  harmonious  development  of  new  production there 
should be  concerted action by  the  member  states  in the  tariff field which 
would  make  it possible  in particular  for  the~ to defend  themselves  against 
dumping. 
In addition,  the  problems  of  the  common  market  for  the  nuclear  industry 
fall within the  scope  of  the solutions  adcpted  for  the general conunon  market. 
in  which  the  former  will ultimately  be  incorporated,  even if these  problems 
must  be  solved  in anticipation of  that development.  In this way  cooperation 
will necessarily be  establ:ished  between  the  t\'IO  European Commissions. Chapter 6. 
Institutional Aspects 
The  description of  the  objectives  and  the  tasks of  EURATOM  has made  it 
possible  in passing  to determine  the  appropriate  procedures.  It has  brought 
into evidence  the  variety of  functions,  namely: 
•  powers  of  decision  as  regards  materials  and  security controls; 
-commercial activities  as  regards  supply; 
- industrial administration functions  as  regards  common  installations; 
a  role  involving studies  and  advice  for --the  eoordination of  rcee~etr, 
the establishment  of  program  forcasts,  and  opinions  on  inve~tment projects. 
Such  diverse  and  continuing responsibilities  can be  exercised only if 
the  current  administration  (>f  the  atomic  Community  is confided  to  a 
permanent  body  capable  of  taking  rapid  action,  i.e.  a  European Commission 
whose  members,  who  would  be  as  linti  ted  in number  as  possible  and  be  appointed 
by  agreement  among  th~  governments,  will have  independent  authority  and  a 
common  mandate. 
This Commission will be  responsible  before  the Assembly,  to  which  its 
budget will be  submitted  for  ar>proval  before  being  adopted  by  the  Council 
acting  by qualified major.ity  vote. 
1be Council  plays  its part  in all problems  in general  policy  and 
participates in certain decisions  under  conditions  already defined. 
The  budget  will cover  in particular  the  operating expenditures of  the 
services  1  the  expenses  of  the  research  and  measur.ement  center,  the  costs of 
participation in common  installations,  and  other  research assistance.  The 
budget will be  prepared  annually within  the  framework  of  a  program covering 
several years;  it must  be  of  a  total size sufficient to meet  the  require-
ments  indicated above. 
Without  excluding  the  possibility of  loans  to cover certain of  the 
expenditures  thus  defined,  it is necessary  to  provide  for  contributions  by 
the States which  could  be  determined either on  the  b~lsis of  their total 
consumption of  energy or  on  the  basis  of  an  arbitrary formula  respecting 
both economic  realities  and  political principles. 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
The  Beads  of  Delegation consider  that  they  have  thus  replied to  the 
question which  was  posed  to  them  by  the  Mes5ina Resolution,  and  which  con-
cerned  the  peaceful development  of  atomic  energy. 
They  have  considered that  the  problem raised  by  the  possibility of  the 
use  by certain states of  atomic  energy  for  military  purposes  presents  a 
political charact~r such  that it goes  beyond  the  limits of  their competence. 
They have  not  believed tt1ey  should  answer  it in  the  present  report. 
This  question has  important  technical aspects,  but  the  Heads  of 
Delegation believe  it possible  to work  out  a  solution which  would  maintain 
the  effectiveness of  the  system they  propose  and  one  of whose  essential 
traits is an air-tight control. 